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of the instant cases, but emphasized in others, include the absence of
prosecuting duties in the administrative trier, the judicial nature of the
proceedings within the agency, the independence of the agency from
political pressures, and any overriding policy considerations that are
presented by a particular case." While these matters are seldom
clearly articulated or discussed by the courts, some otherwise irreconcilable decisions become meaningful when these factors are considered.
The present status of the law can be condensed to a statement that
the findings of fact by an administrative agency will not be disturbed
unless the evidence in the record preponderates against them, but
that application of principles of law is always said to be subject to
an independent judgment by the court. This area of the law is in a
relatively fluid state and is one in which policy considerations and
practical arguments are particularly persuasive, if not controlling,
due to the absence of stratified rules of law and procedure. Both
counsel and courts would do well to consider the problems involved in
the scope of judicial review when faced with advocating or determining an appeal to the courts from an administrative decision.
WnLIAm FRASER

COMMUNITY PROPERTY
Right of Survivorship in Joint Tenancy Bank Accounts. In the
recent case of In re Webb's Estate,' the Supreme Court of Washington
held that if a married man and a single man together establish a joint
savings account with right of survivorship, the married man may take
the total sum on deposit upon the single man's predeceasing him.
However, a seeming inconsistency arose when the court intimated that
if the married man had predeceased the single man, the survivor's
rights would have been subject to the claims of community property. 2
payments from exempt assets in the estates of deceased recipients may have given him
greater insight into the necessity of serving that purpose of the prohibition against
transfers in RCW 74.08.335.
16 For perhaps the most radical attempt by the Supreme Court to make these factors
crucial see Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489 (1943). It is perhaps ironical that
this attempt to promote the decisive influence of practical considerations failed for
practical reasons. Primarily because of opposition from the tax bar and uneven application by the circuit courts, the doctrine fell into ill repute and was repealed by statute
in 1949. The opinion retains its vitality, however, as an expression by the court of its
current feeling towards the whole problem of judicial review. The history of the
doctrine in our courts provides a suggestion of some of the limitations upon that
approach.
1 149 Wash. Dec. 6, 297 P.2d 948 (1956).
2 The same dictum appeared in Toivonen v. Toivonen, 196 Wash. 636, 84 P.2d 128

(1938).
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Kidder, a married man, and Webb, an unmarried half brother living
at the Kidder home, deposited money in a joint account with right
of survivorship. The purpose of the account was to provide a convenient method to save funds in order to purchase a chicken ranch when
Kidder retired. Before this purpose could be realized, Webb died.
Kidder, claiming under the right of survivorship, withdrew the total
funds on deposit. Later, Kidder, acting as the administrator of Webb's
estate, refused to inventory as part of the estate the amount of Webb's
contributions to the account. In a suit by Webb's heirs, the trial court
held that the intent to purchase a chicken ranch was inconsistent with
a right of survivorship to the funds and ordered Kidder to inventory
the amount of Webb's deposit.
This decision was reversed by the supreme court. The court, citing
In re Iver's Estate,3 confirmed the right to create a joint tenancy bank
account, with right of survivorship, by express contract and said,
We cannot agree with the trial court that Kidder and Webb did not
actually make a contract.... They both signed a statement that they
intended and agreed that the 'money now on deposit or hereafter
account payable on either signature and to
deposited . . . is a joint
4
the survivor of either.'

The court then referred to the treatment which had been accorded
insurance contracts under the community property law of Washington.
They pointed out that insurance contracts are generally enforced
according to the wishes of the deceased (insured) until such point that
they conflict with the rights of community property in a surviving
spouse.' Using this as a basis for their decision, the court held that
a contract for a joint bank account with right of survivorship should
also be enforced to such a point, and unless it actually conflicted with
community property law, should be enforced to its fullest extent.
They declared that,
[W]here community funds have been deposited in a joint account
with a right of survivorship in a person not a member of the community
and the deposit agreement is in all other respects valid, the agreement
will be given effect at least up to the point at which the rights of the
survivor might have to yield to the superior right of the surviving
member of the community. ..
34 Wn.2d 477, 104 P.2d 467 (1940).
4 149 Wash. Dec. at 9, 297 P.2d at 951.
r. Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Powers, 192 Wash. 475, 74 P.2d 27 (1937) ; Wilson
v. Wilson,
35 Vn.2d 364, 212 P2d 1022 (1949).
6
This interpretation of the insurance contract cases has not been accepted without
criticism. See Note, 31 WAsH. L. R-v. 146 (1956).
7149 Wash. Dec. at 11, 297 P.2d at 952.
...
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At first glance this dictum seems to give an unjust preference to
community members at the expense of single individuals. Yet, there
is no need to follow the inference of this dictum and incorporate such
an unjust result. The court, in fact, has merely said that where the
contract is in conflict with community property law they will refuse
to enforce it. There is no conflict here.
It is the writer's opinion that a right of survivorship contract is not
in conflict with the community property law where both parties have
deposited funds, and therefore should be enforced for the benefit
of either party.
Clearly, if the transaction were an attempt to make a gift of
community property, then it would not be enforcable. This result
has been definitely established by previous decisions of the court.'
It is also the foundation upon which the insurance cases are based:
that to execute the insurance contracts would be to permit the insured
to make a gift of the proceeds which are community property?
Here there is no attempt to make a gift. The court plainly based
its decision on a contractural right which existed in Kidder and was
derived from the contract as to the joint account.0
A husband has the statutory right to manage the community personal
property." Though this right does not make the husband the owner
of the community personal property, 2 he does have a general power of
management when acting for the benefit of the community." This
control includes the making of contracts for the benefit of the community. 4 Therefore, according to established principles, if the community is to benefit from the transaction, it should be enforceable against
the community.
In the instant case, the parties opened the account for the primary
purpose of purchasing a chicken ranch. Any benefit derived from the
ranch, if it had been purchased, would have passed to Kidder for the
8

Marston v. Rue, 92 Wash. 129, 159 Pac. 111 (1916).
9 Cases cited in note 5 supra.
3o Whether the contract is between the parties or between the bank and the parties
has not been specifically decided. The answer to this question might raise further problems as to the enforceability of the right of survivorship. For a discussion of this
question and the common law rights of survivorship see Rutledge, Joint Tenancy in

Washington Bank Accounts, 26 WASH. L. Rm,. 116 (1951) ; Comment, 16 WASH. L.

REv. 105 (1941).
112 RCW 26.16.030.
1 Hanley v. Most, 9 Wn.2d 429, 115 P.2d 933 (1941).
18 Marston v. Rue, 92 Wash. 129, 159 Pac. 111 (1916); Hanley v. Most, supra
note4 12.
1 Oudin v. Crossman, 15 Wash. 519, 46 Pac. 1047 (1896) ; Floding v. Denholm.
40 Wash. 463, 82 Pac. 738 (1905); Mapes v. Mapes, 24 Wn.2d 743, 167 P.2d 405

(1946).
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benefit of the community and would have been subject to the wife's
claim of community property. The main purpose of the contract was
plainly to benefit the community and as such was a legitimate exercise
of the husband's managerial power. When Kidder and Webb established
the account, they also entered into an aleatory contract. The parties
contracted in regard to a fortuitous event, the death of either party
before the main purpose of the contract could be fulfilled. The consideration flowing from each to the other was the right, if the one
predeceased the other before the ranch could be purchased, of the
survivor to receive the total sum on deposit. This, conceivably,
could result in a loss to the community, but it could also result in a
benefit as evidenced by this case. Should the court say that the power
of the husband does not extend to the making of aleatory contracts,
and if so, on what basis? Should not this be recognized as such a
contract, which is not in conflict with the community property laws
of the state? Each party accepted the hazard that he might die before
the ranch was purchased, which is plainly as fair to the community as
it is to the single individual. This is especially true when it is realized
that the right of survivorship was not the main purpose of the contract,
but only provisional in the event the primary purpose was never
realized.
If this interpretation were to be adopted by the court, it need not
prevent the court from refusing to enforce rights of survivorship in
cases where the community has no opportunity to benefit. In cases
like Munson v. Haye,5 where the married member of the joint account
contributed all the funds from community property and the single
member contributed none, the court would not have to enforce the
contract as there would be no consideration moving from the single
individual to the community. It would be an attempt to make a gift
of community property. This interpretation would also be consistent
with the insurance cases where it is plain that the insured is attempting
to make a gift of community property with no possible benefit running
to the community.
This result appears to be the better solution to the problem. If the
court is to decide otherwise, the community promise as to the right
of survivorship is illusory and the single individual is receiving no
consideration for his corresponding promise, which therefore should
not be enforced against him.
LAWRENCE M. Ross
15 29 Wn.2d 733, 189 P2d 464 (1948) ; see also In re Bush's Estate, 195 Wash.

416, 81 P2d 271 (1938).

